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Population Fluctuation Promotes 
Cooperation in Networks
Steve Miller & Joshua Knowles
We consider the problem of explaining the emergence and evolution of cooperation in dynamic 
network-structured populations. Building on seminal work by Poncela et al., which shows how 
cooperation (in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma) is supported in growing populations by an evolutionary 
preferential attachment (EPA) model, we investigate the effect of fluctuations in the population size. 
We find that a fluctuating model – based on repeated population growth and truncation – is more 
robust than Poncela et al.’s in that cooperation flourishes for a wider variety of initial conditions. In 
terms of both the temptation to defect, and the types of strategies present in the founder network, 
the fluctuating population is found to lead more securely to cooperation. Further, we find that this 
model will also support the emergence of cooperation from pre-existing non-cooperative random 
networks. This model, like Poncela et al.’s, does not require agents to have memory, recognition 
of other agents, or other cognitive abilities, and so may suggest a more general explanation of the 
emergence of cooperation in early evolutionary transitions, than mechanisms such as kin selection, 
direct and indirect reciprocity.
Cooperation among organisms is observed, both within and between species, throughout the natural 
world. It is necessary for the organization and functioning of societies, from insect to human. Cooperation 
is also posited as essential to the evolutionary development of complex forms of life from simpler ones, 
such as the evolutionary transition from prokaryotes to eukaryotes or the development of multicellular 
organisms1. A widespread phenomenon in nature, cooperative behaviour has been studied in detail in a 
wide variety of situations and lifeforms; in viruses2, bacteria3, insects4, fish5, birds6, mammals7, primates8 
and of course in humans9, where the evolution of cooperation has been linked to the development of 
language10.
The riddle of cooperation is how to resolve the tension between the ubiquitous existence of coop-
eration in the natural world, and the competitive struggle for survival between organisms (or genes or 
groups), that is an essential ingredient of the Darwinian evolutionary perspective. Based on existing 
theories11–13, Nowak14 describes a framework of enabling mechanisms to address the existence of cooper-
ation under a range of differing scenarios. This framework consists of the following five mechanisms: kin 
selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, multi-level selection and network reciprocity. These mechanisms 
have been developed and much studied within the flourishing area of evolutionary game theory, and to 
a lesser extent in the simulated evolution and artificial life areas (in computer science).
Our interest in this paper is network reciprocity, where the interactions between organisms in rela-
tion to their network structure, offer an explanation of cooperation. This mechanism is important for 
two reasons. First, whilst cooperation is widespread and found in a broad range of scenarios in the real 
world, many of the mechanisms that have been proposed to explain it require specific conditions such 
as familial relationships (for kin selection), the ability to recognise or remember (for direct and indirect 
reciprocity) and transient competing groups (for multi-level selection) (see Nowak14 for specific details). 
The requirement for such conditions limits the use of each of these mechanisms as a more general 
explanation for a widespread phenomenon. Secondly, the more specific behavioural or cognitive abili-
ties required by some of these mechanisms precludes their use in explaining the role of cooperation in 
early evolutionary transitions. Network-based mechanisms which focus on simple agents potentially offer 
explanations which do not require such abilities. All forms of life exist in some sort of relationship with 
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other individuals, or environments, and as a result can all be considered to exist within networks. Thus 
the network explanation has ingredients for generality which are lacking in the other models.
It has been shown that networks having heterogeneous structure can demonstrate cooperation in 
situations where individuals interact with differing degrees15, effectively by clustering. Populations stud-
ied in this way are represented in the form of a network, with individuals existing at the nodes of the 
network and connections represented by edges. The degree of an individual node indicates the number 
of neighbour nodes it is connected to. Heterogeneity refers to the range of the degree distribution within 
the network. Behaviour in these networks can be investigated using the prisoner’s dilemma game which 
is widely adopted as a metaphor for cooperation.
The majority of studies15–17 investigating cooperation with regards to network structure have focused 
on static networks and hence consider the behaviour of agents distinct from the networks within which 
they exist. Specifically in these works, the behaviour of the individuals within the network has no effect 
on their environment. More recently however, the interaction between behaviour and the development 
of network structure has been considered in an interesting development which shows promise in under-
standing evolutionary origins of cooperation. The Evolutionary Preferential Attachment (EPA) model 
developed by Poncela et al.18 proposes a fitness-based coevolutionary mechanism where scale-free net-
works, which are supportive of cooperation, emerge in a way that is influenced by the behaviour of agents 
connecting to the network.
There is a large body of work devoted to coevolutionary investigations of cooperation (see Perc and 
Szolnoki19 for a review) of which a subset focus on coevolutionary studies within networks20–23. However 
the EPA approach of Poncela, which we investigate further in this report, is notable in that it addresses 
an area that seems to have received very little attention: Specifically it explores how environment affects 
the behaviour of individuals, simultaneously with how such individuals, in return, affect their developing 
environment.
In the EPA model, new network nodes connect preferentially to existing network nodes that have 
higher fitness scores. Accumulated fitness scores arise from agents located on nodes within the network 
playing one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with their neighbours. Strategies are subsequently updated on a 
probabilistic basis by comparison with the relative fitness of a randomly-selected neighbour. The linking 
of evolutionary agent behaviours to their environment in this way has been shown to promote coopera-
tion, whilst the use of fitness rather than degree allows for a broader and more natural representation of 
preferential attachment24. Whilst further exploring the role of scale-free network growth with regards to 
cooperation (which of itself is interesting) the EPA model also implements one-shot rather than iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma and it utilises agents having unconditional (fixed) strategies; hence it potentially pre-
sents a very simple minimal model, in the light of reported findings, for the coemergence of cooperation 
and scale-free networks.
Our investigations here are driven by two observations regarding the EPA model. First, we note that 
the model achieves a fixed network structure very early within simulations, from which point onwards 
agent behaviour has no effect on network structure. Secondly, whilst the EPA model supports the growth 
of cooperation in networks from a founder population consisting solely of cooperators, it does not 
achieve similar levels of success for networks grown from defectors. The broader question of how coop-
eration emerges requires an answer which can generalise to explain emergence from populations that 
are not assumed cooperative initially; hence, in this work we investigate networks grown from founder 
populations which may be cooperators or defectors.
We introduce a modification to the EPA model (see Methods for details) which we consider an 
abstraction common to most, if not all, real populations, that of population size fluctuation. We inves-
tigate whether the resulting opportunity for the agents to continually modify the network, leads to 
increased levels of cooperation in the population. We achieve this fluctuation by truncating the evolved 
network whenever it reaches the specified maximum size. At truncation, agents are selected for dele-
tion on the basis of fitness. Those least fit are removed from the network. The network is grown and 
truncated repeatedly until the simulation is ceased. The original EPA model offered a limited period of 
time for agents to initially affect the structure of their network. Our modification makes this ‘window of 
opportunity’ repeatedly available. Whilst a small number of interesting studies have explored the effect 
on cooperation of deleting network links25–28, or to a much lesser extent, nodes29–31, the process we have 
implemented here differs in that it specifically targets individuals (nodes) on the basis of least-fitness. As 
such it has a very clear analogue in nature, in terms of natural selection.
The question, “How does cooperation emerge?” can be considered from two extreme perspectives, 
firstly the scenario where cooperation develops within a population from its very earliest origins and 
secondly in terms of its emergence within a pre-existing non-cooperative network. In reality cooperation 
may occur anywhere within a spectrum bounded by these two extrema, at different times for different 
sets of events and circumstances, therefore a network-based mechanism to explain this phenomenon 
should be able to deal with either extreme and other positions in between. In testing this model, we 
investigate scenarios where cooperation may develop as a population grows from its founder members 
and we also apply the model to pre-existing randomly structured networks.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Results
Unless stated otherwise in the text, the general outline of the evolutionary process by which our results 
were obtained, occurs for one generation as follows:
1. Play prisoner’s dilemma: Each agent plays one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with all neighbours and 
achieves a fitness score that is the sum of all the payoffs.
2. Update strategies: Those strategies that result in low scores are replaced on a probabilistic basis by 
comparison with the strategies of randomly selected neighbours.
3. Grow network: A specified number (we used 10 in all our simulations) of new nodes are added to 
the network, connecting to m distinct existing nodes via m edges using either EPA or CRA.
4. Remove nodes (only in the case of attrition models): If the network has reached maximum size, it is 
pruned by a truncation process that removes agents on the basis of least fitness
Full details on the specifics of the implementations are provided in the methods section.
Results for networks grown from founder populations. We investigate the effect of population 
fluctuation on networks grown from founder populations consisting of three nodes.
Low levels of truncation result in increased levels of cooperation. For simulations starting from founder 
networks consisting solely of cooperators, we achieved similar profiles to those from the EPA model, 
however when lower levels of truncation (less than 20%) were used we were able to demonstrate consist-
ently higher levels of cooperation than the EPA model for values of b (the temptation to defect) greater 
than 1.6 (see Fig. 1a). Highest levels of cooperation were achieved using as little as 2.5% and 5% trunca-
tion. We observed that cooperation does not reduce to the levels seen for EPA until truncation values 
are reduced to as little as 0.1% (not shown). Whilst large percentage truncations risk deleting some of 
the higher fitness nodes which give the network its heterogeneous (power-law) degree distribution and 
hence aid cooperation, small truncation percentages will be focused on low-fitness, low-connectivity 
nodes, the deletion of which is unlikely to have such a detrimental effect. Also, given small truncation 
values, truncation events will occur at higher frequencies, thus supplying a steady ‘drip-feed’ of new 
nodes which will attach to existing hubs by preferential attachment and hence continually promote a 
power-law degree distribution within the network.
The reason that the EPA model can achieve higher levels of cooperation at b = 1 to 1.6 than the fluc-
tuation model is because whilst it is possible for the EPA model to be completely overrun by cooperators, 
in the fluctuation model however, repeated truncation prevents such a situation occurring. Defectors are 
being added to the population after every truncation event. A similar constraint also applies at the other 
end of the scale, with regards to very low levels of cooperation. So there are limits below 1 and above 
0 which are a result of the truncation size and frequency. These limits restrict the range of cooperation 
values achievable by the fluctuation model.
Cooperation occurs even for populations that are founded entirely with defectors. Our results starting 
from founder populations consisting solely of defectors show an increase compared with levels of coop-
eration achieved by the EPA model (see Fig. 1b). Further, we note that final levels of cooperation arising 
from the fluctuation model for networks founded from cooperator and from defector strategies were 
almost indistinguishable statistically: we tested the dependence of the final cooperation levels observed 
as a function of b, the temptation to defect, and the founding strategy type (C or D), using a nonpara-
metric Sign Test32 (see Table 1).
Fluctuation using random selection can still improve cooperation for defector-founded populations. As a 
control to the effect seen in the fluctuation model, we repeated the above simulations, deleting nodes 
randomly rather than on the basis of lowest fitness. Results are illustrated in Fig. 2. By comparing with 
Fig. 1, it can be seen that there is a clear difference in outcomes. First, for random deletion (Fig. 2), frac-
tions of cooperators present are reduced compared to least fitness (Fig. 1); although, we note that levels 
of cooperation achieved are still independent of the founder population strategy (Fig. 2a,b are approx-
imately equivalent for fluctuation model simulations). Secondly, the percentage truncation parameter 
no longer appears to have any effect on cooperation (all truncation graphs in Fig. 2 look approximately 
equivalent regardless of % values).
Focusing solely on Fig.  2, we now consider the fluctuation model compared to the EPA model. 
In the case of networks grown from cooperator-founders (Fig.  2a), EPA demonstrates higher lev-
els of cooperation than the fluctuation simulations. Truncating the network by a method that simply 
deletes nodes at random is unsurprisingly, less effective at promoting cooperation than the EPA model 
which has been shown to be effective for cooperator-founded networks. In the case of networks grown 
from defector-founders (Fig.  2b), the fluctuation model still achieves the same results as it did for 
cooperator-founders (in Fig. 2a). However in this case, EPA achieves lower levels of performance than 
the fluctuation model featuring ‘random’ truncation. As we have mentioned EPA is generally less effective 
at promoting cooperation when networks are grown from defector-founders.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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How is the fluctuation model, with random truncation, still able to promote cooperation (albeit at 
reduced levels compared to targeted truncation)? The random deletion process will inevitably disrupt 
the formation of the heterogeneous network by deleting the higher degree nodes that are key to the 
scale-free structure. However, this disruption will be countered by the preferential process for addition 
of replacement nodes which is still fitness-based, i.e. new nodes added will still be preferentially attached 
to existing nodes of higher fitness. Heterogeneity of degree, (which supports cooperation) still arises, but 
not to the extent seen for the fluctuation model, which targets least fit nodes for deletion. The preferential 
Figure 1. Effect of truncation size on cooperation. Simulations were run for 2000 generations using the 
EPA and fluctuation models at a range of b values. The graphs plot the fraction of cooperators in the 
population against b values. Each point on the graph represents an average of 25 individual results. Each of 
the individual results is in turn an average of the last 20 generations of a simulation replicate. Plots are 
shown from fluctuation model simulations using 2.5 to 50% network truncation. An EPA simulation is also 
shown which does not feature any truncation. (a) illustrates results grown from founder populations of 3 
cooperators. (b) illustrates results grown from founder populations of 3 defectors. See Figs 3,4, and 
accompanying text for more detailed discussion of within-simulation data variability.
Model n k p-value
EPA 178 151 < 2.20e−16
T 2.5% 240 143 0.003587
T 5% 240 129 0.2724
T 10% 240 126 0.4778
T 20% 240 137 0.03294
T 30% 240 131 0.1751
T 40% 239 136 0.03820
T 50% 239 129 0.2442
Table 1.  Results of a nonparametric Sign Test (using a two-tailed exact binomial calculation), 
comparing the final level of cooperation observed in networks founded with cooperators and networks 
founded with defectors. For each level of truncation, the ∗240 2 independent samples were paired by the 
value of b, the temptation to defect. The column n is the number of non-tied sample pairs. The column k is 
the number of times the C-founded population had a larger final cooperation level than the D-founded 
population. With the standard EPA model there is strong statistical evidence that the cooperator- and 
defector-founded networks differ. For the fluctuation model, the evidence is much less clear. Given the 
power of the test is high here due to the relatively large number of samples used, we can tentatively conclude 
that there is little or no effect of the type of network founding strategy (cooperator or defector) in those 
fluctuation models having above 2.5% truncation.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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attachment process explains why the fluctuation model is still able to have a positive (but reduced) effect 
on levels of cooperation, even when nodes are deleted randomly.
Fluctuation in population size reduces variability within simulation results and increases cooperation. In 
Fig. 3, we provide sample illustrations of time profiles from the EPA and fluctuation models respectively 
(starting from cooperator founders, b = 2.2). The EPA model (Fig. 3a) results in high variability between 
different simulation replicates with some replicates being overrun by defectors (i.e. fraction of 
Figure 2. Effect of random rather than weighted selection of nodes for network truncation. Simulations 
were run as described for Fig. 1 however, in the fluctuation model, least-fitness based node deletion was 
replaced with random deletion. Plots are shown from fluctuation model simulations using 2.5 to 50% 
network truncation. For reference, an EPA simulation is also shown which does not feature any truncation. 
(a) illustrates results grown from founder populations of 3 cooperators. (b) illustrates results grown from 
founder populations of 3 defectors.
Figure 3. Example simulation plots for EPA and fluctuation models starting from cooperator founders. 
Plots show the individual time profiles for 10 replicates using a b value of 2.2. (a) shows the EPA model. (b) 
shows the fluctuation model operating with 2.5% truncation. Generation 100 is marked in both figures by a 
vertical black line. This is the point at which the EPA model reaches a fixed network structure, after which 
no further nodes are added.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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cooperators ≈0). The fluctuation model (Fig. 3b) demonstrates far less variability, with clear transitions 
between two states. Whilst the time at which transition occurs varies, most replicates achieved transitions 
to a consistent level of cooperation – equivalent to, or greater than the highest level observed from 
amongst all simulations in a comparable EPA model.
We considered the possibility that the EPA model may simply require longer for convergence and 
hence ran extended simulations up to 200,000 generations (not shown). We did not see any consistent 
convergence over later generations: whilst some replicates achieved higher levels of cooperation beyond 
2,000 generations, others did not, and some oscillated continually.
Fluctuation results in dramatic increases in cooperation for networks grown from defectors. Figure 4 shows 
replicate simulations grown from defector founders, using the EPA and fluctuation models respectively. 
In the EPA model (Fig. 4a), all replicates are overrun by defectors. In the fluctuation model (Fig. 4b), all 
replicates transition to cooperation.
Ultimately, levels of cooperation achieved are similar for the fluctuation model regardless of whether 
the founder network is cooperators or defectors. We have however noticed that whilst final outcomes are 
typically similar for both types of founding strategy, defector-founded simulations tend to result in later 
times to transitions and greater variation in such times (Figs  3b,4b illustrate this). Generally, for 
cooperator-founded populations, with b values where cooperation was able to arise, we observed transi-
tion of the majority (> 95%) of replicates within our typical simulation period of 2000 generations, with 
delayed transitions becoming more common given increasing b values. For defector-founded popula-
tions, delayed transitions occurred more frequently and to achieve consistent results (> 95% transitioned) 
required 20,000 generations.
Figure 5 illustrates time profile plots, with corresponding network degree distributions, for replicate 
simulations grown from cooperator founders using the fluctuation model. We see that the fluctuation 
model enables all replicates to consistently reach an apparent power-law degree distribution, as previ-
ously reported for the EPA model33. We also observe the same result (not shown) for the fluctuation 
model operating on networks grown from defector-founded populations. In addition, the replicate data 
makes clear that, when cooperation arises, variability in transition times (Fig. 5a) does not correspond 
to variability in degree distribution (Fig. 5b).
The presence of a small number of nodes with degree k = 1 is an artefact of the fluctuation model 
implementation. The fluctuation model grows the network in the same way as EPA (with each new node 
extending m = 2 connections), however the truncation component of the fluctuation model can leave 
residual nodes of degree k = 1 (at low frequencies) due to the deletion of connections from removed 
nodes.
Figure 4. Example simulation plots for EPA and fluctuation models starting from defector founders. 
Plots show the individual time profiles for 10 replicates using a b value of 2.2. (a) shows the EPA model with 
network fixation occurring at generation 100. (b) shows the fluctuation model operating with 2.5% 
truncation. Generation 100 is marked in both figures by a vertical black line. This is the point at which the 
EPA model reaches a fixed network structure, after which no further nodes are added.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Cooperation has a characteristic degree distribution. Whilst in the majority of cases, the fluctuation 
model supported a transition of networks to a higher level of cooperation, we observed that as b values 
increased, the transition was not guaranteed. Figure 6 captures an example of this, for 1 replicate out of 
10 (for b = 2.2). The replicate data demonstrates clearly the difference in degree distributions between 
networks that transition to cooperation and those that do not (the red lines in plots 6a and 6b refer to 
the same replicate).
Figure 5. Time profiles and corresponding final degree distributions for networks grown from 
cooperator founders using the fluctuation model. (a) shows the time profile for a simulation consisting of 
10 replicates with a b value of 2.2. The fluctuation model is truncating networks using 2.5% truncation. (b) 
shows the final degree distributions (at generation 2000) for each of the 10 simulation replicates.
Figure 6. Plot illustrating the difference in degree distribution observed for a replicate that fails to 
achieve cooperation (fluctuation model). Networks were grown from cooperator founders. Simulation 
consists of 10 replicates with a b value of 2.2. The fluctuation model is truncating networks using 2.5% 
truncation. (a) shows the time profile. (b) shows the final degree distributions (at generation 2000) for each 
of the 10 replicates. The red line in (a) (defectors predominate the population) corresponds to the red line in 
(b) (steeper exponent than all other replicates).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Results for pre-existing random networks. The following results look at the effect of the fluctua-
tion model when applied to pre-existing random networks.
Fluctuation drives non-cooperative pre-existing networks to cooperation. Figure  7 shows final levels of 
cooperation achieved in simulations which started from randomly structured networks. Nodes within 
Figure 7. Effect of fluctuation model on pre-existing random networks. The plot shows temptation to defect 
plotted against final fraction of cooperators. Each data point represents an average of 25 individual results. Each of 
the individual results is an average of the last 20(of 20,000) generations of a simulation replicate. The fluctuation 
model used 2.5% truncation. The pre-existing networks were in the form of random graphs with each node 
in the network being populated by cooperators according to probabilities: i) 0, ii) 0.5 and iii) 1. For reference, 
simulations involving a network that was structurally immutable are also shown in iv. For the immutable network, 
nodes were populated with cooperators (or defectors) according to a probability of 0.5.
Figure 8. Degree distributions for pre-existing network at start and end of fluctuation model 
simulations. The plots present aggregate data from fluctuation model simulations of 25 replicates and 
illustrate the starting and finishing degree distributions, after 20,000 generations. The simulations used a b 
value of 2.2 and truncation at 2.5%. The starting networks were in the form of random graphs populated 
entirely by defectors. The same data are represented on linear plots (a) and log log plots (b) in order to 
clearly illustrate, respectively, the apparent Poisson initial and power-law final distributions. In the interests 
of visualising both curves, the linear graph only includes degree values up to k = 20. The error bars shown 
represent 95% confidence intervals for the data.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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these networks were allocated cooperator (defector) strategies according to probability P (1− P) 
Simulations were run for 20,000 generations during which time the majority (> 95%) of replicates tran-
sitioned to cooperation (for those simulations using b values where cooperation was seen to emerge). 
Three pre-existing networks were tested, consisting of i) all cooperators, ii) cooperators and defectors in 
approximately equal amounts, and iii) all defectors. The curves for these three networks are almost 
entirely coincident, again illustrating the emergence of cooperation in the fluctuation model, regardless 
of starting criteria (as seen previously in networks grown from founder populations). A static network 
(iv), where structural changes were disallowed (i.e. strategy updating only), is shown for comparison and 
clearly illustrates the contribution of the fluctuation mechanism.
Fluctuation transforms pre-existing network structure from random to scale-free. In Fig. 8 we show the 
effect of the fluctuation model on degree distribution, for pre-existing random networks, initially com-
posed entirely of defectors. Figure 8a, using linear axes, highlights the initial Poisson degree distribution 
for the pre-existing random network, and Fig. 8b highlights apparent log-log linearity of the final degree 
distribution, that is characteristic of a power-law distribution.
Cooperation appears to be permanent. In several thousands of simulations, excluding the small fluctua-
tions visible in asymptotic states (see Figs 3,4,5), whilst we have observed failures to transition to coop-
eration, we have not observed a single instance of widespread reversion to defection once cooperation 
has been achieved within a population. It would appear that once cooperation is established by means 
of this model, it does not collapse.
Discussion
The main findings of our investigations are that:
1. fluctuation of population size leads to an increase in levels of cooperation compared with the EPA 
model,
2. that the levels of cooperation achieved thus are largely independent of whether the populations 
were founded from defectors or cooperators,
3. that the fluctuation model supports the emergence of cooperation both in networks grown from 
founder populations and also pre-existing random networks.
The time profile plots we have provided in our results, give an indication as to how the fluctuation 
model is able to reach the increased levels of cooperation. Whilst the EPA model results in a high degree 
of variability, the fluctuation model produces consistent transition profiles. The EPA model has two 
interacting dynamic components: preferential attachment and strategy updating. Structural organization 
within the EPA model, which is driven by the preferential attachment component, occurs until the net-
work reaches its defined size limit. Changes in levels of cooperation continue to occur after this point. 
Given that the network structure is fixed, these latter changes can only occur as a result of the remaining 
active component of the EPA model process: strategy updating. Close examination of EPA simulation 
replicate time profiles (as shown in Fig. 3) reveals an interesting observation (for b values greater than 
1.6): At the point where network structure becomes fixed, those replicates having higher levels of coop-
eration at this time, tend to finish with higher levels of cooperation than replicates experiencing lower 
levels of cooperation at the network fixation point. Whilst we do not yet have a detailed understanding 
of how cooperative structure develops within our networks, this observation suggests that prior to the 
network fixation point, some structural precedent is set which gives a probabilistic indication of how a 
network will profit, in cooperative terms, from strategy updating subsequent to structure fixation.
Based on the work of Poncela et al.33 which describes the connection between scale-free network 
structure and cooperation, a plausible explanation for such a structural precedent is as follows: Whilst 
new nodes are preferentially attached to a growing network in a way that may generate hubs and hence 
a scale-free structure, there is no guarantee that the early clusters of nodes appearing in the network 
will be cooperators (cooperator and defector strategies are assigned to newly added nodes with equal 
probability). If the first network hubs appearing in the network are largely occupied by cooperators who 
in turn have cooperative neighbours, then these agents are likely to accumulate high fitness scores. This 
would potentially set the foundation for cooperation since such a group is likely to have a hub which 
would then draw further connections from newcomer nodes and hence promote scale-free structure. On 
the other hand, if early groupings of cooperators are interspersed with large numbers of defectors, this 
is likely to result in defectors preying on cooperators and initially accumulating higher fitness values. 
Strategy updating around such groups would in turn result in the conversion of cooperators present to 
the (at that point in time) more successful defectors. Eventually large groups of defectors will arise and 
result in lower fitness values. In a sea of low fitness values, preferential attachment is less able to demon-
strate the “rich get richer effect” and this is more likely to result in random rather than targetted connec-
tions for newcomer nodes. After network fixation, strategies can be updated, but the network structure 
cannot change and early groupings of defectors in this way are likely to disrupt, impair or sufficiently 
delay the foundation of the scale-free structure that is needed to support higher levels of cooperation. 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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We anticipate forming a testable hypothesis around this explanation as the basis for a subsequent work 
on this model.
The fluctuation model effectively allows a network to “go back in time” to fix structure that may have 
caused such a poor start. The model targets low fitness nodes (and their edges) for deletion. Such nodes 
are more likely to be defectors surrounded by other defectors (a defector–defector interaction results in 
a payoff of zero for both parties). Replacement nodes do not inherit the deleted node’s connections; they 
are preferentially attached to higher fitness nodes. In this way, networks that have a poor start are no 
longer permanently fixed, they have repeated opportunities to address the ‘poorest performing’ elements 
of their structure. When viewed in this way, it is no longer surprising that similar levels of cooperation 
are ultimately achieved regardless of starting strategies. In the same way that this process of continual 
readjustment allows the network to deal with a less-than-ideal initial structure, it similarly allows the net-
work to deal with less than favourable starting strategies. If such strategies perform poorly, then sooner 
or later there is a likelihood they will be deleted, and should their replacements also perform poorly, 
there is a similar likelihood that they too will be deleted.
It is this ability to continually replace poor performing network nodes and connections that sup-
ports the fluctuation model’s striking ability to convert pre-existing random networks, initially populated 
entirely by defectors, to highly cooperative networks with a power-law distribution.
The fluctuation model studied in this paper is not intended as an accurate representation of any spe-
cific real world process, and probably does not map onto any such process precisely. However it may be 
interpreted in several ways as analogues of natural phenomena. We now briefly consider possible inter-
pretations of specific aspects of our model. Firstly, as in the original EPA model, new nodes joining the 
network could be considered as being “newly born into the network” or as “newcomers from outside the 
network”. In either case, they are positioned by preferential attachment in network ‘locations’ which may 
prove advantageous or disadvantageous to them. Secondly, given that the model is one of (Darwinian) 
evolution, we tend to view strategy updates as equivalent to new population members replacing old, 
rather than any form of learning or imitation. This may be viewed as birth-death. In this situation, the 
new strategy ‘inherits’ a set of connections forged by its ancestors along with the advantages or disad-
vantages that those connections confer. Thirdly, fluctuation as we have implemented it, deletes not only 
the least fit agents, but also the connections established over generations by successive offspring at that 
network location. The purpose of deleting both agent and network node is to introduce some form of 
flux into the actual network itself rather than just its constituents’ behaviour. This is a different and more 
disruptive process to that described by strategy updating - perhaps akin to real world scenarios where 
external environmental effects may have wider consequences for an entire population than for just spe-
cific individuals.
Each of these processes is open to alternative interpretations. However, we suspect based on our 
results from this work, that it is not necessarily the exact process that is the important issue here, it is 
merely that, much like most ecological systems in nature, a network continues to be perturbed in some 
way and is hence unable to achieve a permanently fixed structure: it thus continues to adapt. We antic-
ipate that there may be alternative ways of perturbing a similar model to achieve results akin to those 
we have demonstrated.
Conclusion
In summary, natural selection acts as a culling process that maintains diversity. In this work we have 
attempted to generalise the effect of that process across a model of networked individuals – with the 
crucial ability that individuals can locally affect their network in response to such culls. We have intro-
duced a relatively simple modification to the original EPA model, symbolising an effect elemental to 
the behaviour of populations in the real world – effectively some sort of representation of flux in the 
environment. This modification creates the opportunity for individuals in a population to continue to 
test adaptation against the selective pressures of the ecosystem. We have shown that such a feature brings 
about marked increases in levels of cooperation in networks grown from defector-founded populations. 
We have also shown that this feature results in levels of cooperation which are independent of start-
ing behaviour and we have shown that the model can bring about cooperation in both growing and 
pre-existing non-cooperative networks.
It is important that models which seek to explain the origins of cooperation are general and also 
robust to starting conditions. We believe that our model achieves both of these aims and hence our 
findings are of value in the search to understand the emergence and the ubiquity of cooperation.
Methods
Our model and simulations are based on those described in18, but with the addition of a pruning step 
which deletes nodes from the network. We here give a full description of the approach for completeness.
Overview of approach. The models consist of a network (i.e. graph) with agents situated at the 
nodes. Edges between nodes represent interactions between agents. Interactions are behaviours between 
agents playing the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. These behaviours are encoded by a ‘strategy’ vari-
able, associated with each agent, which takes one of two values: cooperate or defect. The game is played 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 1Scientific RepoRts | 5:11054 | DOi: 10.1038/srep11054
in a round robin fashion, with each agent playing its strategy against all its connected neighbours, in 
turn. Each agent thus accumulates a fitness score which is the sum of all the individual game payoffs.
Within an evolutionary simulation, starting from a founding population, this process is repeated 
over generations. The evolutionary process assesses agents at each generation on the basis of their fitness 
score; fitter agents’ strategies remain unchanged; less fit agents are more likely to have strategies displaced 
by those of fitter neighbours. The evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA) process18 connects strategy 
dynamics to network growth: Starting from a small founding population new nodes are added which 
preferentially connect to fitter agents within the network.
Our adaptation of the EPA model adds a further component which repeatedly truncates the network: 
Whenever the population reaches a maximum size, a specified percentage of nodes in the network are 
removed, on the basis of least fitness, after which the network grows again.
Outline of the evolutionary process. As described earlier, the general evolutionary process we 
implement is as follows:
1. Play prisoner’s dilemma
2. Update strategies
3. Grow network
4. Remove nodes (only in the case of attrition models)
In the following, we provide more detail on the specifics of each of the four steps:
Play prisoner’s dilemma. We use the single parameter representation of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
as formulated in16. In this form (the ‘weak’ prisoner’s dilemma), payoff values for the actions, referred to 
as T, R, P and S, become b, 1, 0 and 0 (see Fig. 9). The b parameter represents the ‘temptation to defect’ 
and is set at a value greater than 1 for the dilemma to exist.
From the accumulated prisoner’s dilemma interactions, each agent achieves a fitness score as follows:
∑π= ,
( )=
,f
1i j
k
i j
1
i
where ki is the number of neighbours that node i has, j represents a connected neighbour and π ,i j rep-
resents the payoff achieved by node i from playing prisoner’s dilemma with node j.
Update strategies. Each node i selects a neighbour j at random. If the fitness of node i, fi is greater or 
equal to the neighbour’s fitness fj, then i’s strategy is unchanged. If the fitness of node i, fi is less than the 
neighbour’s fitness, fj, then i’s strategy is replaced by a copy of the neighbour j’s strategy, according to 
a probability proportional to the difference between their fitness values. Thus poor scoring nodes have 
their strategies displaced by the strategies of more successful neighbours.
Hence, at generation t, if fi(t) ≥ fj then i’s strategy remains unchanged. If fi(t) < fj then i’s strategy is 
replaced with that of the neighbour j with the following probability:
=
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Figure 9. Payoff matrix for weak prisoner’s dilemma. 
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where ki and kj are degrees of node i and its neighbour j respectively. The purpose of the denominator 
is to normalise the difference between the two nodes. The term b.max[ki (t),kj (t)] represents the largest 
achievable fitness difference between the two nodes given their respective degrees. (The highest payoff 
value in the prisoner’s dilemma is T, equivalent to b in the single-parameter version of the game used 
here. The maximum possible score for a node of degree k is therefore k  *  b. The lowest payoff value is P 
or S, both equal to zero, giving k  *  b = 0. Thus the maximum possible difference between two nodes is 
simply the maximum possible score of the fitter node.)
Grow network. New nodes with randomly allocated strategies are added, to achieve a total of 10 at 
each generation. Each new node uses m edges to connect to existing nodes. In all our simulations, we 
use m = 2 edges. Duplicate edges and self-edges are not allowed. The probability that an existing node i 
receives one of the m new edges is as follows:
( )
ε ε
ε ε
Π( ) =
− + ( )
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f t
f t
1
1 3
i
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N t
j1
where fi(t) is the fitness of an existing node i and N(t) is the number of nodes available to connect to at 
time t in the existing population. Given that in our model each new node extends m = 2 new edges, and 
multiple edges are not allowed, N  is therefore determined without replacement. The parameter ε ∈ [0,1) 
is used to adjust selection pressure. For all of our simulations ε = 0.99, hence focusing our model on 
selection occurring directly as a result of the preferential attachment process.
Truncate network. On achieving a specified size, the network is truncated according to a percentage X. 
Truncation is achieved by ranking all nodes in order of current fitness scores from maximum to mini-
mum. The X least fit nodes are then deleted from the network. All edges from deleted nodes are removed 
from the network. Any nodes that become disconnected from the network as a result of this process are 
also deleted. (Failure to do this would result in small numbers of single, disconnected, non-playing 
nodes, having static strategies, whose zero fitness values would result in continual isolation from the 
network.) When there are multiple nodes of equivalent low fitness value, the earliest (oldest) nodes are 
deleted first. Where X = 0, no truncation occurs and the fluctuation model becomes the EPA model.
Investigations of the fluctuation model in networks grown from founder populations. We 
investigated networks grown from an initial complete network with N0 = 3 agents at generation t0. 
Founding populations were either entirely cooperators or entirely defectors. We tested a range of different 
sized truncation values from 0.001 to 50% starting from each of the two founder populations (coopera-
tors or defectors). Networks were grown to a maximum size of N = 1000 nodes with an overall average 
degree of approximately k = 4. Simulations were run until 2000 generations. The ‘fraction of cooperators’ 
values we use are means, averaged over the last 20 generations of each simulation (to compensate for 
variability that might occur if just using final generation values). Each data point on ‘b-profile’ plots 
(Figs 1,2,7) is the mean of 25 simulations. Simulations run for the purposes of illustrating time profiles 
or degree distributions were limited to 10 replicates in the interests of clarity.
Investigations of the fluctuation model applied to pre-existing random networks. Random 
networks were generated by randomly connecting edges between a specified number of nodes (i.e. max-
imum size of network). Total number of edges added N  *  k/2, was determined on the basis of a ran-
dom graph of degree k = 4. Simulation parameters were as described previously for founder population 
investigations except, i) we focused on a single truncation value of X = 2.5% and ii) longer run times 
(e.g. 20,000 generations) were generally required for replicate simulations to stabilise, when looking at 
pre-existing networks initially populated entirely with defectors.
In applying the fluctuation model to pre-existing networks, the model simply ‘sees’ a pre-existing 
network, as a ‘grown-from-founders’ network which has reached the point where it requires truncation. 
In essence, the fluctuation model is the same when it is applied to pre-existing networks as it is when 
applied to networks grown from founders.
Where parameters were modified from those described in this methods section (e.g. longer simulations), 
this is made clear in the results.
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